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HUMAN RIGHTS 
Human rights reflect a determined effort to protect the dignity of each and every human being against abuse of power. This endeavour is as old as human history. What is relatively new is the international venture for the protection of human dignity through internationally accepted legal standards and generally accessible mechanisms for implementation. That mission got a major impetus with the founding of the United Nations in 1945. 

While the primary focus of the international project for the realisation of human rights used to be on ways and means of limiting and governing political power, other institutions than the state are coming within its range of attention, too, including those of the corporate world. Recently, a ‘human rights approach’ to poverty has gained a prominent place on the development agenda. It is precisely in this connection that, beside their original protective function, human rights have acquired a transformational (emancipatory) role, too. 

From idea to international mission
The spiritual source of human rights lies in the fundamental belief that the protection of human dignity and equality is a responsibility of society at all its different layers and levels. This should generally limit and govern any use of power over human beings. The starting point is the acknowledgement of every person’s right to exist. People count and in principle no individual counts more, or less, than any other. No one, in other words, is to be excluded from the typical human rights term everyone.

This idea has a great and diverse cultural backing. However, human dignity as a fundamental standard of judgement easily gets twisted into a norm applying ‘to us but not to all those others’. Thus, the Romans already based their legal system upon the rule that freedom is of inestimable value; yet they institutionalised slavery. Indeed, human history manifests a continuous tendency to justify abuse of power by constructing certain individuals and groups regarded as obstacles to the fulfilment of certain ambitions, into categories to which the fundamental ideas of human dignity and equality would not apply.  Thus, crucial qualifications of human rights such as ‘inalienable’ and ‘universal’ tend to meet with a great deal of practical resistance. 

Even more problematic than the support for protection of everyone’s human dignity as such is the way in which that is to be done. With the formation of nation-states the system became to protect people’s basic dignity by law.  Rights have been defined that pertain to all individual human beings as well as to communities. Incorporation in national Bills of Rights was followed by a major international endeavour. The principal documents on which the international project for the realisation of human rights is based – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the two principal International Covenants (for Civil Political Rights, and for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights respectively, both in force since 1976) – are known together as ‘the International Bill of Human Rights’. More specific conventions followed, against torture and racial discrimination, for example, and on child rights and women’s rights. While all states fall under the international mechanism based upon human rights as an essential element in the Charter of the United Nations – with the Geneva based Commission on Human Rights as major supervisory body – the treaties require specific procedures of access and ratification. Separate committees are charged with supervision of the implementation of the various distinct human rights covenants and conventions. 

Indivisibility and interdependence
The interests that are accordingly protected by international human rights law are of a fundamental character in the sense of being directly linked to basic human dignity. Human rights, then, function as abstract acknowledgements of fundamental freedoms and titles that support people’s claims to live in freedom while sustaining their daily livelihoods. The category of rights that protect fundamental freedoms – originally called the first generation of human rights – has been termed ‘civil and political rights’ while the cluster that protects basic entitlements has become known as ‘economic, social and cultural rights’ (the so-called second generation). Obviously, the two are intertwined. It makes not much sense, for example, to tell a starving person that she has fundamental freedoms, including free speech. Nor would a ‘right to food’ be meaningful when people are not free to say that they are hungry. (The latter has actually happened in practice, for instance in cases of famine in Ethiopia and the Sudan.) Notably, implementation of civil and political rights would be meaningless without a simultaneous realisation of  ‘survival rights’ while for a realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, civil and political rights function as empowerment rights, enabling collective action addressing the structures behind non-implementation. This indivisibility and interdependence of distinct categories of human rights received formal recognition in the final declaration of the United Nations Human Rights Summit in Vienna 1993. It includes the incorporation of a third ‘generation’ in the system: the rights of collectivities. Generally, the ordering in first, second and third reflects diminishing degrees of international attention to the rights in question. Thus, the protection of minorities appears to be one of the most problematic elements in the international endeavour for the realisation of human rights.

With regard to economic, social and cultural rights two misconceptions ought to be mentioned. The first is that civil and political rights (CPR) would relate merely to negative freedom in the sense of a liberty from interference by others in the enjoyment of one’s freedoms while economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) would be purely based on positive freedom in the sense of opportunity. At first sight this might seem to be a logical qualification: no torture, no detention without trial, no censorship etc. versus a positive responsibility to secure enough food for everyone, good education, public health etc. Yet, CPR actually require a positive investment, too: well functioning judicial systems, including good prisons and solidly established democratic institutions. Furthermore, the fulfilment and protection of ESCR does not only place a large burden on the fiscal capacity of states; these rights can also be violated through public policies that intervene negatively in people’s own entitlements to ensure satisfaction of their basic needs.

The second fallacy is that contrary to CPR, ESCR would be rights without remedies, and mere ‘aspirations’. In real life implementation of rights is never automatic. Litigation always requires action on the part of the rights-holders first, and the possibility to clearly identify duty-bearers, next. Furthermore, in legal disputes the interests of one person or collectivity always have to be weighed against those of others in the light of distinctive rights and principles. This applies to both categories of rights. Thus, there are certain contexts in which the ‘justiciability’ of CPR becomes highly problematic – civil war, for example – while in particular cases of concrete and identifiable violations the implementation of ESCR can be legally enforced (see our reference to the South African Grootboom case below).  Crucially, moreover, the impact of human rights is not confined to their instrumental role of legal resources. These rights also play their part as political tools of a transformational nature. This vital point too, will be further explained below.

The human rights deficit
In terms of the role and rule of law, society is expected to function in such a way that rights are respected, and claims based on entitlements connected to those rights get honoured. Dispute settlement is confined to cases in which there are conflicting claims protected by different rights (between landlord and tenant, for example). Yet, in the case of human rights adequate embodiment in positive law is all too often missing, while they get violated in and from centres of political power, too. There are notable differences in context here. Whereas in some countries freedom of speech, for example, is protected by a historically acquired right, in other countries it is merely based on an internationally declared right that is still structurally violated from the national political centre. In the case of economic, social and cultural rights general recognition at the centres of power in the global economy is even lacking.  

Thus, the global endeavour for the realisation of human rights suffers from a huge deficit that is all too often submerged in the general euphoria of human rights declarations, conferences, committee meetings and workshops. This deficit manifests itself in four distinct realms: (1) the precarious struggle against impunity of state-related perpetrators of violations of civil and political rights; (2) the apparent lack of protection of minorities; (3) the persistent inability of state law to protect people behind the walls of privacy, and its paralysing effects on the struggle against domestic violence; and (4) the non-fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) in a world in which so many people’s basic needs apparently remain denied. 

Indeed, for people living in daily hardship human rights mean protection of entitlements that they simply do not have. Thus, everyone has an internationally acknowledged right to health but hundreds of millions of people lack access to sanitary services and clean water. Accordingly, for the poor human rights tend to constitute an abstract recognition of their basic needs without the actual entitlements that would enable them to satisfy these.  Entitlement, in an economic context, means actual protected access to resources and actual protected command over goods and services. Clearly, then, for poor people it is actual entitlement that matters, more rather than universally declared rights. 

Human rights strategies
In fact, while the whole idea of rights is based upon the expectation that evident violations would lead to contentious action resulting in redress, human rights often remain without effective implementation. This is due to two crucial obstacles: firstly, the often prevailing inadequacy of law as a check on power, and secondly, the lack of reception of these rights in many cultural and politico-economic contexts. 

Yet, the implication of such critical constraints in the operational impact of universal human rights is not that these rights lose all meaning in processes of development and the attack on poverty. While in Western history individual human rights got a place in the statute books at the end of processes of societal transformation, in most of the developing world these internationally accepted standards stand at the beginning of emancipation and social change. Their function, in other words, is not so much protection (what ought to be protected would still have to be acquired), but rather transformation. Moreover, these internationally recognised rights play their part not merely as legal resources (implying a reliance on functioning legal systems) but also as political instruments in the sense of internationally enacted standards of legitimacy that are meant to govern any use of power. 

Actually, a judicial case-by-case approach to concrete violations of human rights is just one possible option in efforts to realise human rights. Legal literacy programmes are a way of raising awareness on people’s rights in general. A political case-by-case approach uses protest and other forms of dissent as ways of protecting fundamental interests against policies and action that violate people’s human dignity. Even in the lives of those already facing daily hardships, such resistance appears to be often necessary. But the most pressing challenges lie in persistent non-implementation of human rights. It is the economic, political and social structures behind such situations that would have to be addressed. Here collective action would be called for, aiming at structural reforms.

These four distinct types of human rights strategies may be illustrated by a simple matrix showing the focus of human rights with regard to two major functions, protection and transformation, as well as two categories of means towards implementation: legal resources and political instruments.


Human rights in a functional as well as an instrumental setting

FunctionalInstrumental	Protective	Transformational 
Legal resources	Judicial action (case by case)	Legal literacy programmes aiming at awareness-building
Political Instruments	Dissent and protest against policies and actions violating human dignity	Collective action addressing power relations embodying structural injustice


Human rights and development
The character of human rights as ‘declaratory’ rather than ‘conclusive’ concerns economic, social and cultural rights in particular and manifests itself especially in countries in the South. This has to do with a socio-economic context: no jobs, no access to land and hence extreme pressure on scarce productive resources. Such conditions appear to breed frustration and aggression rather than recognition of other people’s freedoms and needs. But there is also a political setting that finds its background in the history of colonialism and its effects on the distribution and control of power, both internationally and in local contexts. As a result the struggle for social justice in the developing world faces serious constraints. Internationally that endeavour has not yielded impressive fruits up till now. As a result of decisions taken in the name of economic progress, the poor often have to face increasing hardships from day to day. In that dim light the idea emerged to connect the struggle for human development to human rights. 

The Human Development Report 2000 with its special focus on human rights, may be seen as a first response to UN Secretary General Annan’s appeal for a ‘mainstreaming’. Indeed, the persistent efforts towards integrating development, security and governance through a compelling focus on the human being – human development, human security and human rights – may be seen as central to the Human Development Reports of UNDP. It is basic human dignity that links the three together.

Notable in the discourse that is usually employed in this connection is, first of all, the use of the term ‘approach’. Apparently, the idea is no longer to plan, steer or direct but just to approach poverty and the need for development. This terminology is in line with the earlier shift in emphasis from development as programming structural improvement of the economy to human development as ‘a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.’ The language used here is Amartya Sen’s (see, for example, his Development as Freedom published in 1999). It is, indeed, particularly his thinking that appears to have influenced the Human Development Reports in general and the 2000 Report on the human rights approach in particular. In an earlier publication to which the Human Development Report 2000 refers, Sen (1999b) had already summarised the case for human rights from a developmental perspective in three aspects: ‘(1) their intrinsic importance, (2) their consequential role in providing political incentives for economic security, and (3) their constructive role in the genesis of values and priorities’ (p. 99). Fundamental freedoms, in other words, have intrinsic as well as instrumental value: without freedom there is no development, and with freedom, development as a process of uplifting personal well-being is enhanced. 

Implications of a human rights approach to poverty and destitution
In its Guidelines on Poverty Reduction (2001) the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) already noted an ‘increasing focus on the “rights approach”, which links empowerment to international agreements on human and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights’. Possibly stimulated by the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Development by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the World Bank has proclaimed this right as a new guideline to its policies. In line with the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development of 1986, this is held to imply, among other things, a persistent focus on participation from the grassroots and distributional equity (article 2 [3]).

Notably, rights based approaches to poverty go beyond development approaches tuned to increasing productivity as the way towards progress (usually interpreted as pure ‘positive-sum games’). In rights approaches poverty is seen as ‘a pronounced deprivation in well-being’, as the World Bank has put it in its World Development Report 2000/2001, or, in current UNDP terminology, as ‘a brutal denial of human rights’. Hence, the primary focus in such strategies is not on some abstract and general phenomenon – the number of people who have to survive on less than so much per day – but on human beings and their daily hardships, here and now. 

Behind the non-implementation of poor people’s rights lie complicated social, political and economic structures. In rights approaches the primary responsibility to address these is with the rights-holders themselves. Yet, when people get faced with insurmountable constraints to the realisation of their rights, other actors are to be called to their duties. In cases of concrete violations such responsibilities of other actors tend to be quite evident. When a government orders poor people’s shacks to be bulldozed down, for example, the duty bearer in respect of their right to shelter becomes easily identifiable: the state. Such situations may even lead to court cases, as has happened in the South African Grootboom case (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 4th October, 2000). More common, however, are general patterns of structural non-implementation of the rights of the poor. In such a setting human rights imply a duty for actors to engage in policies that respect fundamental freedoms and basic entitlements following from internationally declared standards. This applies not just to the state but also to institutions of the corporate world.

Finally, rights approaches imply a strong normative component guiding the execution of power by all actors. This element, too, distinguishes rights based strategies clearly from needs based approaches to poverty and destitution. When human rights are seen as not just legal resources but also political instruments, this means that power is to be regarded as legitimate only if international human rights standards are followed. Legitimacy, in other words, becomes the core concept, referring to the right institutions and principles, the right procedures and also normatively acceptable outcomes. Hence, rights-based approaches to overcome poverty imply efforts to address economic injustices as well, in the first place at the level of the global economy as such.
Bas de Gaay Fortman
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